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economic-judicial institutions on happiness seems to dominate those of political 
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sample, while analyses restricted to middle- and high-income countries show an 
additional strong support for a beneficial effect of political institutions. Our results bear 
important implications which we discuss in the concluding section of the paper. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the study of subjective well-being gained wider interest in the early nineties in 
both academia and among the public, such diverse countries as Australia, France, the 
United Kingdom, and Bhutan have gradually begun considering the maximization of 
citizens’ ‘happiness’ as a national goal. Even though the field now known as ‘happiness 
studies’ has come a long way since its beginnings in psychology, the advent of serious 
discussions in mainstream politics about including happiness goals in policy evaluations 
has made the study of potential happiness policies even more urgent (e.g., Layard, 
2006). 
One of the main questions in this literature is to what extent national institutions 
affect people’s happiness. Institutions, defined broadly by North (1990) as ‘the rules of 
the game’, regulate public and private affairs in all modern societies and could thus be 
expected to exert an important influence on individual well-being. Modern economics 
and political science assign ‘institutions’, both formal and informal, a key role in 
society, for example by fuelling economic openness, promoting growth, and stabilizing 
markets and democracy.1 Indeed, the significance of informal institutions such as social 
trust – unwritten rules, social norms and codes of conduct – is recognized by many 
studies as a key source of happiness, at least in rich countries (Diener, Diener and 
Diener, 1995; Uslaner, 2002). 
It seems a priori reasonable to conjecture that the quality of formal institutions of 
society should also affect the subjective well-being of its citizens. Well-functioning 
legal systems provide and enforce property rights, insuring citizens against violence, 
                                               
1
 See Zak and Knack (2001), de Haan, Lundström and Sturm (2006), Aidt and Gassebner (2007), 
Engerman and Sokoloff (2008), Méon and Sekkat (2008), and Gassebner, Keck and Teh (2009). 
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theft and economic exploitation, while democratic institutions and political 
decentralization provide everyone with the means to influence the political process 
(Frey and Stutzer, 2000a; Bjørnskov, Dreher and Fischer, 2008b). Good institutions 
may also create additional ‘procedural utility’, shown to exceed by far the contribution 
to well-being of the pure allocation effect (Stutzer and Frey, 2003).2 
Given the importance of formal institutions for everyday life, it is surprising that 
only few empirical studies address this issue – and those that do come to inconclusive 
results (cf. Helliwell, 2006; Ovaska and Takashima, 2006; Bjørnskov, Dreher and 
Fischer, 2008a; Dorn et al., 2007). We ask what the reason for this lack of consensus 
may be. Previous papers came to different conclusions because of using different 
measures of happiness, different institutional indicators, different control variables, and 
different samples. In this paper, we therefore re-investigate the impact of institutional 
quality on happiness using one common framework. Holding sample size constant, and 
controlling for a common set of variables, we investigate whether and to what extent 
several measures of institutional quality affect happiness. Moreover, we ask the 
question of which type of formal institutional quality matters? We report the results of 
Principal Components Analysis, derive two main dimensions of institutional quality, 
and relate them to happiness.  
An additional problem with the previous literature is that the effect of institutional 
quality has been investigated in samples of rich and poor countries pooled together. As 
we will argue below, the impact of institutions will likely differ among these groups of 
                                               
2
 Moreover, informal institutions such as social trust – the belief that most people can be trusted to follow 
common societal norms – as well as other types of social capital can arguably also contribute to creating a 
safe and fulfilling social environment (cf. Uslaner, 2002; Helliwell, 2006). 
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countries. As additional contribution to the literature, we therefore investigate the 
potentially different effects of institutions on happiness for rich countries separately. 
To anticipate our results, we find that institutional quality indeed increases 
happiness. Our results are, however, not completely robust to how aggregate life 
satisfaction is defined. The analysis points to a differential role of economic-judicial 
governmental quality as compared to political institutions in the course of overall 
societal development. These differences might partly explain the contradictory results of 
previous studies neglecting these differences. 
We proceed as follows. The next section presents our indicators of institutional 
quality and relates them to happiness. Section 3 reports our data and estimation method, 
while section 4 shows the results. The final section concludes and derives policy 
implications. 
 
2. Happiness and institutional quality 
Studies of happiness and life satisfaction have explored a very large range of potential 
determinants at the micro, meso and macro level. Quite often, the findings have been 
contradictory and even when not, the results of the literature can be puzzling in the light 
of existing theory in economics and political science, and of common sense. The 
potential influence of formal institutions on average levels of happiness in different 
countries has been explored in a number of previous studies, and of the myriad of 
formal institutions that could in principle affect people’s well-being, the following have 
been particularly in the focus of previous research: the presence of democratic 
institutions and civil liberties, the quality of legal institutions and the rule of law, 
government effectiveness and economic freedom, alongside with political constraints at 
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the federal level such as bicameralism, subsidiarity in political decision-making and 
spending decentralization. 
According to Frey and Stutzer (2000a, 934), “extended individual participation 
possibilities in the form of initiatives and referenda” in Swiss cantons contribute to 
individual happiness in Switzerland; see also Frey (2008, ch. 14). These results, 
however, seem not to be statistically robust to controlling for differences in state culture 
or the data employed for analysis, as shown in Dorn et al. (2008).3 Similarly, the recent 
multi-level study in Bjørnskov, Dreher and Fischer (2008a) finds no robust association 
between the extent of democratic rights and individual life satisfaction in a sample of 66 
countries, while Dorn et al. (2007) report a positive association for 26 mostly OECD 
countries. The differential outcomes of those previous studies might arguably be caused 
by their focus on different country samples. More specifically, the level of economic 
development of the countries in those samples might drive the results. We return to this 
below.  
Turning to the effects of institutional quality and the rule of law, the recent cross-
country studies by Helliwell (2006), Helliwell and Huang (2008) and Ovaska and 
Takashima (2006) show rather clear support for positive effects of institutional quality 
on happiness, while Fischer (2008) finds that a stronger rule of law prevents market 
competition from increasing the happiness-gap between the rich and the poor. On the 
other hand, Bjørnskov, Dreher and Fischer (2008a) find almost no association between 
                                               
3
 Statistical non-significance of a factor does not necessarily imply that it is not relevant to people’s well-
being. In the case of Swiss cantons, the very high correlation between political institutions and local 
culture (language majority: German, French, Italian) might prevent statistical identification of separate 
effects. This problem is less prevalent in cross-national studies with more independent variation of both 
factors. 
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institutional quality and individual happiness in a cross-section of about 66’000 
individuals from 66 countries. Again, the differences might be driven by either an 
omitted variable bias, the different choice of sample or neglecting the heterogeneity of 
effects at the individual level, which may be considered a form of ecological fallacy.  
In the related area of political decision-making, the extent of constraints on 
politics, but also the strength of political veto players may affect people’s happiness. A 
common argument is that most people are status-quo biased, and that the presence of 
such constraints slows down the political reform process4 and prevents the ‘tyranny of 
the majority’ (Alt and Lowry, 1994; Tsebelis, 1995; König, 2001), thus increasing the 
well-being of the average risk-averse individual (Bjørnskov, Dreher and Fischer, 
2008a). Indeed, the results of Henisz (2000, 2002) indicate that constraints on policy-
making are associated with objectively better economic outcomes. 
Often, the presence of veto players is directly linked to formal institutions that 
relate to the organization of government in a (potentially) multi-tier political system, 
such as decentralized government spending structures, often alongside shared political 
power at the federal level. A direct beneficial impact of fiscal decentralization (but not 
of political autonomy) and bicameralism was identified in Bjørnskov, Dreher, and 
Fischer (2008a, 2008b). 
In addition, the aggregate cross-country studies by Helliwell (2006) and Ovaska 
and Takashima (2006) – one stressing government effectiveness, the other economic 
freedom – also suggest a clear positive impact of the quality of these two formal 
                                               
4
 “For the initiator [of a new system] has the enmity of all who would profit by the preservation of the old 
institution and merely lukewarm defenders in those who would gain by the new ones”, Machiavelli, The 
Prince, 1513, cited in Feinberg (2006). 
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institutions on well-being. In contrast, the multi-level Extreme Bounds Analysis in 
Bjørnskov, Dreher and Fischer (2008a) shows very little support for any robust effects, 
positive or negative, of these two types of formal institutions. Additional cross-country 
findings in Bjørnskov, Dreher and Fischer (2007) also indicate no impact of government 
effectiveness per se on average happiness.  
All of these studies assume that the effects of institutional quality are homogenous 
across the sample – mostly developed and developing countries – an assumption that 
may not hold in reality and could partly be responsible for the confusing findings. 
Helliwell and Huang (2008) provide a first indication that this may be the case, as they 
interpret their findings to imply that honest and efficient public service provision 
increases happiness in relatively poor countries while political and electoral institutions 
are positively related to happiness in relatively rich countries. 
In general, one may argue that, as these studies are mostly based on correlations, 
causality and causal interpretations may not be valid. In line with Frey and Stutzer 
(2000a), however, we base causality on the observation that institutions do usually not 
substantially change over time, and are often the result of long-lasting historical 
processes. For example, the decentralized structure in Germany and Switzerland 
resulted from the loose state structure of the early middle ages (with a ‘weak’ king), 
while the unitary government structure in France is a heritage of the development of a 
‘strong-king-center’ reflecting an intense control over his noblemen’s tributes and tax 
payments since 1400 (later renewed through Napoleon’s government reforms). 
Likewise, specific, efficient characteristics of British and Scandinavian legal systems 
can be traced far back in time (Glaeser and Shleifer, 2002; Lookofsky, 2008). 
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To sum up, the findings of these previous studies are virtually impossible to 
compare as they vary in (1) their sample sizes, (2) their definitions of happiness 
measures (aggregate country averages versus aggregated top three categories), and (3) 
the set of macro-level variables that is controlled for in the empirical models. 
In this paper, we try to remedy some of these shortcomings and extend the 
existing literature by: (1) employing a common framework relying on the same set of 
observations throughout by using a panel of the widest range of countries and 
institutional measures possible; (2) analyzing subsamples identifying differential 
impacts for rich countries only; (3) using two distinct measures of aggregate happiness, 
one reflecting mean satisfaction in the population, the other relating to the population 
share of the happiest people according to a 10-point scale; and (4) investigating a wide 
range of measures of institutional quality that we group along two dimensions, using 
Principal Components Analysis (PCA). 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1. Data 
We draw aggregate data from a number of sources. To measure national levels of life 
satisfaction, we employ two different indicators, based both on the survey question ”All 
things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?”, which 
respondents answer on a ten-point scale. The life satisfaction scores employed here are 
taken from all the five available waves of the World Values Survey (WVS, 2009), a 
repeated cross-section with a growing number of participating countries.5 Our first 
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 First wave: 1981-1984, second wave: 1989-1993, third wave: 1994-1999, fourth wave: 1999-2004, fifth 
wave: 2005. 
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measure of happiness follows Helliwell (2006) and the approach in the World Database 
of Happiness in using the average national score on the life satisfaction question. As an 
alternative, we rely on the World Values Survey coding in using the percentage of the 
population answering in the top three categories, which arguably makes the measure 
less sensitive to cultural differences in answering at the extremes of the scale (cf. 
Bjørnskov, Dreher and Fischer, 2007). While the correlation across the two measures is 
.95, the country rankings do change slightly between these measures. As discussed in 
section 2, with our focus on institutional determinants of happiness, both reverse 
causality and ecological fallacy are not likely to be a problem here. In particular, the 
exclusion of relevant individual-level factors could severely bias our results if their 
inclusion resulted in different country rankings. However, to test for the presence of 
ecological fallacy we calculate the country fixed effects from running a standard 
individual-level ordered probit regression (cf. Bjørnskov, Dreher and Fischer, 2008a), 
obtaining a measure of differences in macro happiness not pertaining to individual-level 
factors. Comparing these country fixed effects estimates with the alternative aggregate 
happiness measures employed in this study suggests that an ecological fallacy is not 
likely to be present: their correlations are .99 (for the simple average happiness) and .92 
(for the top three coding), respectively. 
 The average life satisfaction measure is usually viewed as good overall assessment 
of national happiness, but clearly more sensitive to respondents in either tail of the 
happiness distribution, namely to very low or high ranges of the life satisfaction score, 
compared to the top-share. On the other hand, using the share of respondents answering 
in the top-three categories mitigates some specific cultural differences in response styles 
that may introduce unnecessary noise when using average happiness (cf. Bjørnskov, 
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2006). We remain agnostic with respect to which measure is the more precise, including 
which measure provides a better solution to the potential cardinality problem (see, e.g., 
Ng, 1997), since two different types of cultural response styles could bias the measures 
in opposite directions.6 
To test for the impact of the quality of formal institutions on life satisfaction, we 
employ a set of alternative governance measures: 1) the ‘legal quality’ index from the 
Fraser Institute (Gwartney and Lawson, 2008); 2) the combined Gastil index of civil 
liberties and political rights from Freedom House (2008); 3) the Polity IV index of 
democracy from Marshall and Jaggers (2004); 4)-5) Helliwell’s (2006) two groups of 
variables relating to “the honesty and efficiency of government” and “the operation of 
the democratic process,” which may be viewed as proxy of democratic rights;7 and 6)-
8) three indices from Henisz (2000, 2002), the first measuring the extent of constraints 
on policy-making, the second measuring the strength of political veto players, and the 
third capturing the extent of ‘law and order’. Except for the Gastil index, higher values 
                                               
6
 Bjørnskov (2006) argues that the WVS coding is more appropriate if respondents in some countries are 
averse to answering in the top category. However, if respondents are averse to answering far from the 
mean, i.e., averse to both ‘too’ positive and ‘too’ negative answers, resulting in a mean-preserving 
cultural spread, the average measure would be more precise. As we have no way of assessing the relative 
importance of these types of biases, we proceed by tentatively interpreting the measures as if they were 
precise. 
7
 These variables derive from Kaufmann et al. (2008), with the first variable being the average of 
government effectiveness, regulatory efficiency, rule of law and lack of corruption, and the second 
variable the average of voice and accountability, and political stability. Helliwell arrives at measures for 
1990 and 1981 by extrapolating the Kaufmann data from 1996 (the earliest observation) into the past 
(personal communication, July 22, 2009). These two highly correlated indices are also used in Helliwell 
and Huang’s (2008) analysis of government quality for happiness. 
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correspond to improved institutional quality or more binding institutional constraints. 
The eight institutional measures are summarized in Table 1. 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
Two of our legal institutions indices (‘legal quality’, ‘law and order’) capture the 
protection of property rights. While among the political institutional measures the Gastil 
index measures the protection of political rights and civil liberties more broadly –
capturing also the freedoms of speech and of association – ‘citizens’ political rights in a 
narrow sense are reflected in the Polity IV index. The remaining indices are designed to 
measure either government effectiveness or the degree of discretion in policy-making. 
By testing these indicators against each other we hope to be able to evaluate which 
types of governance are responsible for potential consequences on average national 
happiness. Descriptive statistics of the institutional variables are shown in Table 2 while 
sources are given in the Appendix. 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
In choosing our control variables, we take the specification in Helliwell (2006) as 
our starting point and supplement it by additional aggregate variables found to be 
important determinants of well-being in Bjørnskov, Dreher and Fischer (2007).  
The set of control variables includes an indicator of social capital: the average 
number of membership in nine different types of voluntary organizations, which in the 
tradition of Putnam (2000) aims to capture social activity and social networks. As 
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measure of informal societal institutions we also employ social trust – an indicator of 
honesty and trustworthiness – which is measured by the percentage of respondents 
answering ‘yes’ to the question “In general, do you think most people can be trusted?” 
Since recent studies indicate that the quality of formal institutions is affected by social 
trust, including this measure of informal institutions is arguably important as we would 
otherwise risk overestimating the importance of formal institutions (cf. Knack, 2002). 
Following Helliwell (2006), our baseline specification also includes a measure of how 
strongly people believe in god (expressed by the national percentage answering ‘yes’ to 
the question “Do you believe in a superior being”), which might also be considered as a 
type of informal institution (cf. North, 1990). We also control for the divorce rate and 
the official unemployment rate. Divorce rates have been shown to negatively affect 
happiness (e.g., Helliwell, 2006), and so has the national unemployment rate (e.g., 
DiTella et al. 2001). As the effect of economic development is highly debated in the 
happiness literature, we also include the logarithm to GDP per capita throughout (cf. 
Easterlin, 1995). This gives us a maximum sample of 148 pooled country-year 
observations from 62 countries potentially observed in either waves, namely in 1981, 
1990, 1995, 1999, and 2005, for which we have full data. All countries are listed in 
Appendix Table A2. Descriptive statistics of the control variables are shown in Table 2 
while sources are given in the Appendix. 
The baseline model consists of the institutional quality measure, the social capital 
variable, the two informal institutions measures (‘social trust’ and ‘belief in god’), the 
divorce and unemployment rates, and a measure of national income. In the course of our 
analysis, this baseline model is then supplemented by a set of additional variables. First, 
we include dummies for postcommunist countries, Latin America and Asia, which 
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previous research shows to be highly significant (Bjørnskov, Dreher and Fischer, 2007, 
2008a). Second, we add period fixed effects to the model to take care of joint macro 
trends over time, such as business cycles, and of the changing country composition of 
our sample across waves. Third, we augment the model with openness to trade and the 
investment price level relative to the U.S., both of which are measures of international 
integration and business prospects; in recent studies, these have been found to be 
robustly positively associated with happiness (e.g., Bjørnskov, Dreher and Fischer, 
2007, 2008a). As well-working institutions may promote trade and growth (prospects) 
(as, e.g., the institutional reforms in China show), omitting these factors from the model 
would lead to an overestimation of the pure effect of institutional quality.8 
 
3.2. Methodology 
In the following, we estimate the influence of the institutional indicators in this 
unbalanced country-panel dataset as pooled OLS with Beck and Katz’s (1995) panel 
corrected standard errors (PCSE). Assuming that disturbances are heteroscedastic, 
allowing for panel-specific variances in unbalanced panels corrects for a bias in the 
standard errors that may otherwise inflate significance levels. In other words, using 
PCSE generates more conservative estimates. As happiness and institutions change 
                                               
8
 Bjørnskov, Dreher and Fischer (2008) find additional robust determinants of life satisfaction. However, 
not all are significant in this sample and others are only available for a small number of observations. We 
therefore do not include these variables in the full specification, but note that the results reported below 
remain unchanged if adding the additional variables. 
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slowly over time, inclusion of country fixed effects is not advisable even though our 
sample spans up to 25 years.9  
It may be argued that pooling the data increases the number of observations 
artificially. Furthermore, the unbalanced structure of the data gives some countries 
greater weight in the estimates than others. However, the main results remain when we 
weigh observations giving each country equal weight. They also remain when we use 
the 1999-cross-section only. 
Finally, to test whether the impact of institutions on happiness differs among poor 
and rich countries, we also use a reduced sample of rich country observations with an 
average GDP per capita above 10,000 purchasing-power parity adjusted US dollars; this 
sub-sample includes 96 country-year observations from 31 countries. We chose a 
threshold level of 10,000 USD as it is approximately the level at which most studies 
find average income to cease being associated with subjective well-being, excluding 
roughly one third of all observations and countries (Schyns, 1998; Dolan, Peasgood and 
White, 2008).10 All results are reported for both happiness measures using the full 
sample and the reduced sample of rich countries. 
 
                                               
9
 In an additional set of results, we allow for an estimated first-order autoregressive disturbance, which 
equally corrects otherwise biased standard errors. Given that institutions change slowly over time, even 
with a time gap of 5 years or more across waves the assumption of first-order autocorrelation is justified. 
We do not report these estimates in the following as all results are robust to allowing for autocorrelation; 
however, these results are available on request. 
10
 When splitting the sample at what may seem a somewhat arbitrary level of USD 10,000, it should be 
noted that all results remain qualitatively unchanged when we apply other cut-offs of, e.g., USD 9,000 or 
11,000. As such, the subsample results in the following do not depend on the specific cut-off chosen here. 
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4. Results 
As a first simple way of illustrating the potential effects of institutional quality on life 
satisfaction, as well as demonstrating the difficulty in separating institutional measures, 
Table 3 reports the simple and partial correlations (controlling for GDP) between the 
institutional variables as well as their correlations with the two measures of happiness. 
First of all, the table illustrates the difficulty in separating different institutional 
characteristics, as most indices are highly related. The relative exceptions are the Polity 
IV index and the two political constraints indicators that are more moderately correlated 
with the remaining institutional indices. However, it is worth noting that a relatively 
large share of rich countries scores a perfect 10 on the Polity IV index, which is 
therefore effectively right-censored.11 Second, the partial correlations also show that 
controlling for joint variation due to GDP per capita (which is highly correlated with 
institutional quality) reduces some of the correlations among the institutional measures 
and thus makes it potentially easier to separate the effects of single institutions on 
happiness. In other words, part of the identification problem seems to lie in economic 
development confounding relations between institutional indices. 
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
The remainder of this section is structured as follows. First, we replicate the results in 
Helliwell (2006) for our two measures of happiness – based on constant samples of 
                                               
11
 It is also well known that countries tend to fare better on the Polity IV index of democracy than on the 
alternative Gastil index of political rights and civil liberties or Henisz’s (2000) measures. As explained in 
the previous section, the reason is that the latter two indices apply a broader concept of democracy that 
also entails civil rights (like, e.g., economic freedom). 
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countries – thereby testing the robustness of previous results to the choice of dependent 
variable. We add additional control variables to see whether previous results arise from 
omitted variables bias. Second, we employ the different indicators of institutional 
quality introduced above to test which dimension of institutional quality is most 
robustly linked to happiness. Finally, we report the results of Principal Components 
Analysis, deriving two main dimensions of institutional quality, and relating them to 
happiness. 
 
4.1. Are formal institutions associated with happiness? 
Column 1 of Table 4 replicates Helliwell’s (2006) results using the ‘honest and efficient 
government’ indicator and his original specification (thus excluding period and region 
dummies) with average national happiness as dependent variable, whereas the 
corresponding column in Table 5 instead reports the results for the share of respondents 
in the top three categories. 
As the estimates in column 1 of Tables 4 and 5 show, in the baseline specification 
our variable of main interest, government efficiency, increases happiness according to 
both definitions of national happiness, with a coefficient significant at the one percent 
level. As regards the control variables, their effects are equally qualitatively identical 
across the two definitions of well-being. Contrasting Helliwell (2006), however, the 
effects of social networks (‘average memberships’) are not robust to using the larger 
sample. At the one percent level, and in support of Helliwell (2006), we find that social 
trust, believing in god, and economic development increase average and ‘top three’ 
well-being, while divorce and unemployment rates reduce it. 
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A series of model extensions are reported in columns 2-5 of both tables. Column 2 
adds a dummy for postcommunist countries and the regional dummies for Asia and 
Latin America.12 Column 3 includes the period dummies, while column 4 adds trade 
openness and the investment price level that are arguably correlated with efficient 
government institutions; column 5 excludes poor countries from the regression sample. 
Again, we hold the samples across Tables 4 and 5 constant so that the observed 
differences are exclusively due to differences caused by the additional explanatory 
variables included in the model and as to how we measure happiness. 
Across our models and the two happiness measures, some minor differences 
emerge for the control variables: According to the results for the average coding 
reported in Table 4, membership in voluntary organizations is significant at the ten 
percent level in columns 3 and 4, which is not the case for the population share of the 
happiest (in the rich country samples of columns 5 in Tables 4 and 5, social capital is 
insignificant for either happiness measure). In contrast, the unemployment rate no 
longer affects average happiness according to columns 3-5 (possibly indicating a social 
norm effect; cf. Clark, Knabe and Raetzel, 2008), but still reduces well-being when 
focusing on the share of happiest in the population.13 While the effects of the divorce 
                                               
12
 As the tables show, the introduction of regional dummies substantially improves the statistical fit. With 
respect to these variables, it is worth mentioning that people in Latin American countries, in particular, 
are happier than the average. The difference to the rest of the world, all other things held constant, is 
+0.44 points on the average measure and +5.6 percentage points when using the WVS coding. 
13
  We can only speculate on why unemployment becomes insignificant when using the average measure 
of happiness. However, it seems a priori likely that unemployment mainly moves people out of the 
bottom of the top categories and into a lower category, thus only affecting the happiness average 
marginally, but emerging clearly in the alternative measure. We also note that the effects of 
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rate are robust when using the average coding, the coefficient is not significant in any of 
the additional regressions when using the top three coding (columns 2-5 of Table 5). 
Not surprisingly, per capita GDP loses significance when focusing on the more 
homogenous group of rich countries in column 5 of Table 5 (but not in Table 4).  
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
Turning to our variable of interest – the effects of honest and efficient 
governments – we basically replicate Helliwell’s (2006) main findings when keeping to 
his specification, regardless of how the dependent variable is defined. This holds when 
adding the postcommunist and regional dummies, and when including the period 
dummies (columns 2 and 3 of Tables 4 and 5). When using the average coding, the 
result equally remains when controlling for trade and the investment price level in 
addition (column 4 of Table 4), which is not the case when employing the population 
share of the happiest people: in column 4 of Table 5 institutional quality is no longer 
significant at conventional levels. The decrease in coefficient size of the ‘efficient 
government’ estimates in columns 2 and 3 (as compared to column 1) and of column 4 
(as compared to column 3) suggests that government efficiency varies systematically 
                                                                                                                                          
unemployment and membership substantially weakened when adding period fixed effects. As such, due to 
our data covering more periods, this effect seems to reflect that these factors tend to follow a joint, 
international business cycle. 
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across world regions, but rather not over time, and that it is associated with increased 
trade openness and positive business prospects, as we conjectured.  
When focusing on the subsample of rich countries in columns 5 of Tables 4 and 5, 
however, for both measures of well-being the coefficients are again significant, at least 
at the ten percent level. Overall, there hence seems to be some support for the 
importance of institutional quality on happiness, using either measure of population 
well-being. The results in both tables nevertheless indicate that the simple model of 
column 1 overestimates the effects of formal institutions. Calculating elasticities, the 
results show that the beta coefficient is cut in more than half when including the 
additional relevant control variables, and even fails the ten percent level of significance 
in the full model of column 4 in Table 5.  
Taken all together, quality of both formal and informal institutional quality 
appears to be conducive to people’s life satisfaction in rich countries. However, while 
the effects of social trust and belief in god are robust to varying model specifications, 
this is not the case for the effect of ‘honest and efficient governments’: it is not robust to 
the choice of happiness measure, particularly when economic covariates are added to 
the model. Using the average coding, which both includes changes away from misery 
(the bottom of the happiness distribution) as well as changes towards actual happiness 
(the top of the distribution), a one-standard deviation shock to formal institutions 
induces an improvement in happiness of approximately one fourth of a standard 
deviation while a shock of similar size to trust results in a similar improvement in 
happiness.  
Arguably, a main critique one could direct against the results in Tables 4 and 5 is 
that, given the rather strong correlations between various measures of governance, they 
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do not inform about which type of formal institutions matters; one indicator of 
institutional quality might just proxy for another.  
 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
Table 6 employs the (new) baseline of column 4 in the previous tables (that 
includes period dummies, regional dummies, and all economic factors) to test the 
potential importance of the broader number of alternative institutional indicators as used 
in the previous literature and summarized in Table 1, again focusing on the same set of 
observations. Specifically, we replace the ‘honest and efficient government’ indicator 
by one other institutional index at the time to test which of them is most robustly related 
to well-being. Again, we also report results for a sample restricted to richer countries. 
According to the results, the overall impression is that in the full sample 
institutional quality is positively correlated with happiness, while political rights and 
constraints appear to matter more to richer countries. These findings are fairly robust to 
the type of happiness measure employed.  
In detail, legal quality from the Fraser Institute is a significant determinant of 
happiness for both measures of happiness and across both samples. This is also reflected 
by the significance of the Gastil index and Helliwell’s (2006) democracy index, 
although their effects are substantially larger for the sample of only rich countries. 
These measures have in common that they do not only relate to decision-making in 
political institutions in a narrow sense, but also capture aspects of economic freedom 
(Gastil), a well-working judiciary (legal quality), and political stability (democratic 
process) which are all three important to economic investments. 
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Among the measures that are more narrowly related to the political process only, 
we use the Polity IV index, which is intended to capture the importance of democratic 
political institutions as opposed to market and judicial institutions. The result reveals a 
more mixed picture, as the index is not significant at conventional levels in the full 
sample when using the average measure, but is substantially stronger in the case of rich 
countries. Likewise, Henisz’s (2000, 2002) two measures of political constraints follow 
the general structure of the Polity IV index by being significant in the rich subsample 
but not in the full samples. In the last panel, the evidence for Henisz’s law and order 
index, on the other hand, is rather weak throughout.  
Without wanting to overstate the differences, it consequently seems that the 
quality of formal institutions that relate to free markets and judicial impartiality matter 
in the full sample and for rich countries likewise, while the effect of indicators that are 
more restricted to components of political institutions and participation rights tends to 
matter in the sample of rich countries only, with betas between .2 and .4. Nevertheless, 
due to the high interrelatedness of these measures, the robustness of any single finding 
is uncertain.  
Table 7 summarizes the results of testing the strength of the institutional indicators 
against each other. For all eight indices, respectively, one additional index of the seven 
remaining ones was added at the time to the regressions shown in Table 6. Table 7 then 
reports the number of instances out of seven in which the index remains significant at 
conventional levels of significance. As such, the results can indicate the relative strength 
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of each institutional indicator.14 For both life satisfaction measures, democratic process 
quite clearly dominates in the total sample, always being significant at the five percent 
level at least. However, quite strong results are also obtained for legal quality and the 
Gastil index. For the rich country sample it is less clear which index dominates as the 
Political Constraints III measure also remains significant at conventional levels in most 
cases. 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
Overall, in Table 7 the evidence for the effects of formal institutions on happiness 
remains mixed and rather inconclusive. First, the fairly robust impact of democratic 
process, legal quality and the Gastil index across the two different definitions of 
happiness and the two sample sizes is quite striking. On the other hand, for the richer 
countries the overall picture looks different where both measures of legal quality, the 
Gastil index of civil liberties, the democratic process measure, and Political Constraints 
III are reasonably robust.  
With respect to the Polity IV index, in particular, it must be stressed that there is 
rather little variation in these indices at the top of the global income distribution. As 
such, their profiles tend to follow the pattern of the effects of economic development on 
happiness. In other words, the specific relation between these indices and GDP per 
capita implies that they are relatively likely to pick up the non-linear relation between 
average income and happiness documented in other studies (cf. Schyns, 1998). Seen in 
                                               
14
 An important caveat of this exercise is that the measures are correlated. As such, a few results in Table 
6 may be potentially misleading as variance inflation factors in roughly a quarter of the cases are close to 
or above 5 and in a limited number of cases above 10.  
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the light of this feature, the relative strength of the Gastil index may be more remarkable 
as it measures the status of both economic-judicial and political institutions, resulting in 
much larger variation compared to the more narrowly defined Polity IV democracy 
measure.15 
 
 
4.2. Splitting economic-judicial and political institutions using PCA 
As the results in Table 7 suggest, it is difficult to separate the effects of different indices 
of formal institutions on happiness since they are highly correlated – as shown in Table 
3 – and strongly related to economic development. In addition to the standard analysis 
we therefore perform the following simple three-step test: 1) we first follow Bueno de 
Mesquita et al. (2003) in calculating the residuals of regressing the eight indicators on 
(log) GDP per capita, thereby taking out most joint variation due to economic 
development, and leaving only variation that is strictly institutional instead of following 
from economic capacity (see also Hicken, Satyanath and Sergenti, 2005); 2) we use 
these residuals as if they were precise measures of institutions in a principal components 
analysis (Table A3 in the Appendix reports the specifics of this analysis); and 3) we 
rerun the analyses above using the component solution of the analysis. As such, this 
procedure has the double advantage that most variation caused by economic 
development is excluded from the resulting indices, and that these indices are 
orthogonal by construction. Problems due to joint variation hidden in most indices of 
                                               
15
 Indeed, splitting the Gastil index in political rights and civil liberties shows that the variation of the full 
index across the richer countries is driven by civil liberties, mirroring the invariance of the more narrowly 
defined Polity IV index. 
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institutional quality that would prevent identification of differential effects of different 
types of institutions are thus alleviated. 
First of all, the principal components analysis supports the existence of two 
orthogonal components that can be readily interpreted as a political institutions 
component and a component capturing the quality of economic and judicial institutions 
(see Table A3), corroborating the differential findings of Table 7; as such, the results are 
broadly consistent with the similar analysis in Munck and Verkuilen (2002) who find 
two broadly similar institutional dimensions.  
Using these two scores – which we term ‘political factor’ and ‘economic factor’ – 
in place of the primary indices therefore should provide more precise estimates on the 
importance of the two separate institutional types for happiness compared to the 
analyses above. As Table 8 quite clearly shows, this actually is the case. 
 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
 
The results in Table 8 document a positive effect of economic-judicial and 
political institutions for both measures of life satisfaction, in the full sample and the 
rich-country subsample alike. However, for either measure of life satisfaction, the 
political dimension of institutional quality is clearly stronger when excluding relatively 
poor countries (columns 2 and 4). In other words, our results indicate that whenever 
countries have reached a certain level of economic development, the development of a 
democracy may be beneficial for overall national happiness. In contrast, the 
development of factors such as a fair and efficient legal system affects the concerns of 
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citizens to an equal extent in both samples.16 The last section summarizes and discusses 
the significance of the full set of findings. 
 
5. Conclusions and policy implications 
What contributes to happiness, and whether national happiness can be altered has 
recently become a key topic in the new literature on happiness. However, many 
empirical findings have been conflicting, not least those pertaining to the potential 
influence of institutional quality. This paper looks closer into the association between 
the quality of formal institutions and national happiness, paying specific attention to the 
differential effects of different types and different indicators of institutional quality. 
Particularly, we have estimated the potential influence of formal institutions by 
employing eight different indicators of institutional quality and governance, employing 
a constant set of countries. In addition, we have taken account of the strong correlation 
among measures of institutional quality by deriving factor scores which yielded two 
separate dimensions of good governance – economic-judicial quality and political 
influence. Finally, we took account of the differential impact of institutional quality on 
happiness in low as compared to high income countries. 
Overall, our results support the existence of a positive and significant effect of 
institutions on average national happiness. However, the results also illustrate the 
difficulty in separating different types and dimensions of institutional quality, as well as 
                                               
16
 It should be stressed that if we re-estimate the specification with only poor countries, political 
institutions entirely lose significance. On the other hand, the effects of economic-judicial institutions 
remain strongly significant for the average measure although not for the top three measure. The results 
pertaining to the political dimension thus reflect strong effects in fairly rich countries and no effects in 
poor countries. 
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measuring such factors with precision. The high correlations between institutional 
indicators make strong specification tests between indicators infeasible, forcing us to 
employ alternative empirical strategies.  
Creating two artificial measures of institutional quality constructed with factor 
analysis provides some support for the existence of independent effects of overall 
economic-judicial and political institutions. The economic-judicial type seems to 
dominate the political institutions type when a sufficient number of developing 
countries enter the sample, while analyses restricted to middle- and high-income 
countries show an additional strong support for a beneficial effect of the political 
institutions type. This finding is in line with Dorn et al. (2007) and Helliwell and Huang 
(2008), both showing that democracy contributes to happiness in cross-sections of 
richer countries. As such, one could conjecture that the difficulty of obtaining any clear 
pattern in previous studies may have been because these studies have ignored the 
specific heterogeneity of the effect by economic development that we find here.  
Overall, our findings based on the factor scores indicate a robust and positive 
association between the quality of formal economic-judicial and political institutions, 
and national happiness. The size of these effects, measured as the change induced in 
happiness from a one-standard deviation change in institutional quality, vary between 
one sixth and one third of a standard deviation, with marginal effects slightly larger for 
the subsample of richer countries, and are therefore of economic and social significance.  
Our results suggest that citizens may derive subjective well-being from having 
democratic political institutions whenever the bulk of the population has escaped real 
(absolute) poverty. Yet, before that goal has been reached, only economic-judicial 
institutions protecting life, ensuring property rights and providing economic 
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opportunities contribute to happiness, and simultaneously may also fuel economic 
growth (cf. Knack and Keefer, 1995; Berggren, 2003; Engerman and Sokoloff, 2008). 
From a methodological point of view, our empirical findings suggest that part of the 
controversy in the literature may simply stem from the systematic parameter 
heterogeneity of the institutional estimates that may have biased full-sample estimates 
towards zero in most large-sample studies. 
A final question to be touched upon is whether our findings hold any policy 
implications. We explicitly do not discuss whether governments should attempt to 
follow such implications – a question which Frey and Stutzer (2000b) address at length 
– but only whether the findings hold potential implications. 
First, the results indicate that the strength of legal quality is associated with 
happiness. One of the potential ways to raise national happiness would thus seem to be 
to invest in a fair and efficient legal system and to allow for economic opportunities in 
poor and rich countries alike, as indicated by Ovaska and Takashima (2006). An 
additional side-benefit of such an approach would also be higher economic growth as 
suggested by the vast literature on the topic. However, the everlasting problem remains 
how to encourage/enforce a fair and efficient legal system in which citizens can have 
confidence. 
Second, our findings suggest that democratization would in general be beneficial 
for national happiness when countries have reached a certain level of economic 
development at which most basic needs are met for the majority of the population. 
However, even if economic development and achieving a basic level of quality of life is 
an explicit aim of international development aid, the results of that literature show that 
such efforts by befriended governments are at best ineffective (e.g., Knack, 2004). The 
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democracy literature suggests that when countries approximately reach the cut-off level 
of 10,000 USD employed here, democratization becomes steadily more likely and more 
stable with additional growth (cf. Lipset, 1959; Paldam, 2007). Nevertheless, as the 
previous literature suggests, even though democratic rights therefore in general seem to 
lead to more happiness in richer countries, there are apparently other ways to increase 
citizens’ well-being. 
At the end of the day, we are therefore left with a set of findings that entail rather 
difficult implications. Fair and efficient judicial systems seem to contribute to both 
happiness and economic development, but the persistent lack of such characteristics in 
many third world countries also suggests that institutional quality cannot simply be 
transplanted or copied from other countries. For middle and high-income countries, the 
existence of democratic political institutions is also positively associated with 
happiness. The restriction of the effect of such institutions in richer countries, 
fortunately, represents only a minor problem, as most studies find that democracy tends 
to emerge when countries reach a certain level of economic development (e.g., Lipset, 
1959; Paldam, 2007).  
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Table 1. Institutional measures 
Name Source Description 
Legal quality Fraser 
Institute 
(Gwartney 
and Lawson, 
2008) 
Overall measure of the quality and capacity of the legal system, 
consisting of indices of judicial independence, impartiality of the 
courts, protection of intellectual property rights, military 
interference in law and politics, and integrity of the legal system. 
Gastil index Freedom 
House 
(2008) 
Index capturing the existence of political rights and civil liberties; 
lower scores mean better protection of rights and liberties. 
Polity IV index Marshall and 
Jaggers 
(2004) 
Index intended to capture three essential elements of democracy: 1) 
institutions and procedures enabling citizens to freely express their 
preferences for policies and leaders; 2) effective constraints on the 
exercise of power by the executive; and 3) the civil liberties of 
citizens to participate in the political process. 
Honest and 
efficient gov. 
Helliwell 
(2006) 
Average of rule of law, regulatory quality, bureaucratic efficiency 
and control of corruption indices from Kaufmann et al. (2003). 
Democratic 
process 
Helliwell 
(2006) 
Average of political stability and voice and accountability indices 
from Kaufmann et al. (2003). 
Political 
constraints III 
Henisz 
(2000, 2002) 
Index capturing constraints on the feasibility of policy change, 
defined as the degree to which a change in the preferences of one or 
more political actors is permitted to affect government policy. The 
index effectively measures the number and strength of political veto 
points. 
Political 
constraints V 
Henisz 
(2000, 2002) 
Index employing the same data and logic as Political constraints III, 
but adding veto points within the judiciary and sub-federal entities. 
Law and order Henisz 
(2000, 2002) 
Law and Order index from Political Risk Services (1996). Higher 
scores imply “a strong law and order tradition;” lower score mean “a 
tradition of depending on physical force or illegal means to setting 
claims.” 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
 Mean Standard deviation Observations 
Life satisfaction, average 6.989 .956 149 
Life satisfaction, top three 48.942 17.599 149 
Average memberships .429 .313 149 
Social trust .316 .152 149 
Belief in god .417 .267 149 
Divorce rate 1.832 1.112 149 
Unemployment rate 8.352 4.669 149 
Postcommunist .228 .421 149 
Openness to trade 74.936 47.680 149 
Investment price level 83.601 30.392 149 
GDP per capita 16,607 8,527 149 
   149 
Legal quality 7.005 1.571 149 
Gastil index 1.985 1.287 149 
Polity IV index 7.763 4.041 149 
Honest and efficient government .928 .892 149 
Democratic process .789 .679 149 
Political contraints III .442 .142 149 
Political contraints V .698 .187 149 
Law and order 4.752 1.204 149 
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Table 3. Correlations between life satisfaction and institutional measures 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Honest and efficient 
government 
1 .91 
(.73) 
.84 
(.56) 
-.69 
(-.21) 
.50 
(.01) 
.34 
(.18) 
.56 
(.31) 
.76 
(.49) 
2. Democratic process  1 .81 
(.49) 
-.76 
(-.39) 
.58 
(.21) 
.40 
(.30) 
.58 
(.33) 
.73 
(.42) 
3. Legal quality   1 -.64 
(-.09) 
.42 
(-.04) 
.32 
(.16) 
.59 
(.39) 
.76 
(.52) 
4. Gastil index    1 -.91 
(-.86) 
-.47 
(-.39) 
-.57 
(-.35) 
-.56 
(-.13) 
5. Polity IV index     1 .48 
(.39) 
.51 
(.31) 
.39 
(.00) 
6. Political constraints 
III 
     1 .53 
(.46) 
.27 
(.11) 
7. Political constraints V       1 .65 
(.48) 
8. Law and order        1 
         
Average .66 .56 .53 -.48 .35 .21 .29 .39 
Top three .65 .57 .53 -.49 .39 .23 .28 .41 
Note: partial correlations in parentheses, controlling for GDP per capita. 
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Table 4. Basic results, “average” coding 
 1 2 3 4 5 
.229 .121 .289* .248* -.015 Average memberships 
(.155) (.137) (.155) (.145) (.179) 
2.056*** 1.830*** 1.730*** 1.850*** 1.568*** Social trust 
(382) (.346) (.356) (.358) (.382) 
1.751*** 1.057*** .944*** 1.014*** .867*** Belief in god 
(.229) (.207) (.243) (.254) (.239) 
-.242*** -.154*** -.138*** 
-.126*** -.114** Divorce rate 
(.049) (.045) (.046) (.042) (.053) 
-.022** -.018** -.012 -.011 -.004 Unemployment rate 
(.009) (.009) (.009) (.009) (.012) 
Log GDP per capita .425*** .359** .356** .380** .482** 
 (.137) (.154) (.162) (.153) (.218) 
 -.561*** -.493** -.502** -.272 Postcommunist 
 (.196) (.205) (.206) (.271) 
Openness to trade    .002** .002** 
 
   (.001) (.001) 
.004*** .004* Investment price level    
(.001) (.002) 
.477*** .356*** .356*** .265** .342** Honest and efficient 
government (.111) (.113) (.115) (.111) (.151) 
Regional dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Period dummies No No Yes Yes Yes 
Sample All All All All GDP>10,000 
Observations 148 148 148 148 96 
Countries 62 62 62 62 36 
R squared .707 .772 .785 .802 .757 
Wald Chi squared 360.42 463.91 546.33 613.45 299.75 
Note: estimation is with pooled OLS; panel corrected standard errors in parentheses; *** (**) [*] 
indicates significance at p<.01 (p<.05) [p<.10]. “Average” is the country’s mean in life satisfaction, with 
life satisfaction measured on a 10-point scale.  
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Table 5. Basic results, alternative (“top three”) coding 
 1 2 3 4 5 
3.336 1.411 2.303 1.399 -4.211 Average 
memberships (3.067) (2.708) (3.201) (2.913) (3.923) 
44.110*** 41.470*** 41.839*** 44.855*** 41.918*** Social trust 
(7.707) (7.305) (7.528) (7.324) (8.495) 
31.035*** 16.799*** 15.715*** 17.329*** 13.539** Belief in god 
(4.481) (4.292) (4.942) (4.798) (5.349) 
-2.646*** -1.300 -1.042 -.747 -.118 Divorce rate 
(.921) (.822) (.848) (.769) (1.101) 
-.454** -.489** -.425** -.388** 
-.502* Unemployment rate 
(.196) (.192) (.196) (.183) (.278) 
Log GDP per capita 6.859** 6.148** 5.691* 6.312** 5.972 
 (2.664) (2.904) (3.125) (2.929) (5.294) 
 -9.472** -9.397** -9.689** -8.083 Postcommunist 
 (3.744) (3.926) (3.842) (5.776) 
Openness to trade    .061*** .062*** 
 
   (.018) (.020) 
 .089*** .089*** Investment price 
level 
  
 
(.025) (.057) 
7.894*** 5.216** 5.291** 3.062 4.697* Honest and efficient 
government (2.137) (2.093) (2.185) (2.075) (2.671) 
Regional dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Period dummies No No Yes Yes Yes 
Sample All All All All GDP>10,000 
Observations 148 148 148 148 96 
Countries 62 62 62 62 36 
R squared .645 .735 .742 .769 .754 
Wald Chi squared 392.75 536.68 583.06 638.78 333.49 
Note: estimation is with pooled OLS; panel corrected standard errors in parentheses; *** (**) [*] 
indicates significance at p<.01 (p<.05) [p<.10]. “Top three” is the country’s population share of those 
reporting in the highest three categories of life satisfaction, with life satisfaction measured on a 10-point 
scale.  
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Table 6. Alternative institutional measures 
  Average Average Top three Top three 
  All GDP>10,000 All GDP>10,000 
Legal quality .148*** .202*** 2.132*** 2.947*** 
  (.043) (.053) (.806) (.928) 
Observations 148 96 148 96 
R squared .808 .781 .776 .766 
Wald Chi squared 635.86 338.84 674.91 419.01 
Gastil index -.127** -.293*** -2.735*** -5.215*** 
  (.051) (.073) (.881) (1.406) 
Observations 148 96 148 96 
R squared .803 .791 .781 .784 
Wald Chi squared 553.99 364.32 594.11 373.68 
Polity IV index .023 .060*** .668** 1.245*** 
  (.015) (.019) (.275) (.391) 
Observations 148 96 148 96 
R squared .797 .766 .779 .775 
Wald Chi squared 545.69 314.51 580.34 323.50 
Democratic process .459*** .817*** 7.329*** 12.379*** 
  (.123) (.122) (2.231) (2.685) 
Observations 148 96 148 96 
R squared .813 .813 .782 .784 
Wald Chi squared 652.68 653.98 680.95 627.65 
Political constraints III .274 1.392*** 6.202 26.604*** 
  (.333) (.344) (5.961) (6.785) 
Observations 148 96 148 96 
R squared .793 .779 .768 .781 
Wald Chi squared 567.63 334.31 609.31 381.08 
Political constraints V .207 1.267*** 2.086 17.515** 
  (.279) (.370) (4.484) (6.889) 
Observations 148 96 148 96 
R squared .793 .783 .766 .765 
Wald Chi squared 572.37 387.86 613.17 428.84 
Law and order .024 .108 -.578 1.255 
  (.051) (.067) (.984) (1.257) 
Observations 148 96 148 96 
R squared .792 .744 .767 .747 
Wald Chi squared 566.47 282.68 601.22 305.07 
Note: Unbalanced country panel. Pooled OLS with panel corrected standard errors in parentheses; *** 
(**) [*] indicates significance at p<.01 (p<.05) [p<.10]. “Average” is the country’s mean in life 
satisfaction, while “Top three” denotes the population share of those reporting in the highest three 
categories of life satisfaction. Life satisfaction is measured on a 10-point scale.  
 
 
 41
Table 7. Which indicators are robust? 
  Average Average Top three Top three 
  All GDP>10,000 All GDP>10,000 
Legal quality 6 6 5 5 
Gastil index 4 7 5 6 
Polity IV index 1 3 5 4 
Honest and efficient gov. 4 3 0 0 
Democratic process 7 7 7 7 
Law and order 0 0 0 0 
Political constraints III 0 5 0 6 
Political constraints V 0 4 0 1 
Note: The numbers count the instances in which the indicator remains significant at p<.05 when one other 
indicator is added at the time to the regressions reported in table 6. Results in parentheses refer to 
estimates obtained with an autoregressive disturbance. “Average” is the country’s mean in life 
satisfaction, while “Top three” denotes the population share of those reporting in the highest three 
categories of life satisfaction. Life satisfaction is measured on a 10-point scale. See also table 6. 
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Table 8. Testing types of institutions 
  Average Average Top three Top three 
  All GDP>10,000 All GDP>10,000 
.204*** .279*** 2.468** 3.737*** Economic factor 
(.065) (.071) (1.194) (1.348) 
.109** .253*** 2.712*** 4.956*** Political factor 
(.053) (.073) (.943) (1.531) 
Observations 148 96 148 96 
Countries 62 36 62 36 
R squared .815 .814 .787 .794 
Wald chi2 622.08 475.49 617.19 554.70 
Note: robust standard errors in parentheses; *** (**) [*] indicates significance at p<.01 (p<.05) [p<.10]; 
all regressions include the baseline variables. “Average” is the country’s mean in life satisfaction, while 
“Top three” denotes the population share of those reporting in the highest three categories of life 
satisfaction. Life satisfaction is measured on a 10-point scale. 
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Table A1. Data sources 
Variable Source Measured as 
Life satisfaction, top 
three 
Population percentage 
Life satisfaction, 
average 
1 (low) to 10 (high) 
Average 
memberships 
Population percentage 
Social trust Population percentage 
Belief in god 
World Values Survey (2009) 
Population percentage 
Divorce rate Share of marriages 
Unemployment rate 
World Bank (2007) 
Share of active labor 
force 
Postcommunist  0 (no) / 1(yes) 
Openness to trade Share of GDP 
Investment price 
level 
Investment price level 
relative to US 
investment price level 
GDP per capita 
Penn World Tables, Mark 6.2 (Heston et al., 2006) 
ppp adjusted US 
dollars 
Legal quality The Fraser Institute (Gwartney and Lawson, 2008) 0 (low) to 10 (high) 
Gastil index Freedom House (2008) 1(high) to 7 (low) 
Polity IV index Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers, 2004) 0 (low) to 10 (high) 
Honest and efficient 
government 
Helliwell (2006) -2.5 to 2.5 
Democratic process Helliwell (2006) -2.5 to 2.5 
Law and order Henisz (2000) 0 to .74 
Polcon III Henisz (2002) 0 to .89 
Polcon V Henisz (2000) 2 to 6 
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Table A2. Countries included in the study 
Albania Hungary Russia 
Argentina Iceland Serbia 
Australia Indonesia Singapore 
Austria Ireland Slovak Republic 
Belgium Italy Slovenia 
Brazil Japan South Africa 
Bulgaria Jordan South Koreah 
Canada Latvia Spain 
Chile Lithuania Sweden 
Croatia Luxembourg Switzerland 
Cyprus Malta Taiwan 
Czech Republic Mexico Thailand 
Denmark Moldova Trinidad and Tobago 
Dominican Republic Morocco Turkey 
Egypt Netherlands Ukraine 
El Salvador New Zealand United Kingdom 
Estonia Norway United States 
Finland Peru Uruguay 
France Poland Venezuela 
Germany Portugal Vietnam 
Greece Romania  
Note: countries in italics are those with at least one observation with a GDP per capita above 10,000 
USD. 
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Table A3. Principal components analysis 
Variable Economic factor Political factor Uniqueness 
Honest and efficient gov. .836 .136 .267 
Democratic process .787 .319 .257 
Legal quality .657 .008 .455 
Gastil index -.289 -.869 .154 
Polity IV .004 .883 .207 
Law and order .514 .019 .530 
Polcon III .187 .387 .571 
Polcon V .371 .277 .411 
Eigenvalue 3.392 1.284  
Variance explained .491 .407  
Note: component loadings have been rotated. 
 
  
 
